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ARTIFICIAL PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW
the last few years, there has been an unprecedented volume of legislative enactments by which artificial presumptions designed to facilitate proof by prosecutors
in criminal cases, have been incorporated into the penal laws
of many jurisdictions. This appears to be due partly to the
recognition by prosecutors that such presumptions inevitably
minimize their labors in the procurement of convictions and
partly to the fact that the courts have been more than liberal
in the construction and application of this type of enactment.'
Indeed, it is not unlikely that this judicial trend in the present transitional age is influenced by the general feeling that
the rights of the individual are secondary to the demands of
the state.2 As a consequence, too little attention seems to
have been paid by legislators to the dangers to liberty that
lurk in this simplified and extremely mechanistic method of
conviction, and to the peril that arbitrary oppression in the
guise of artificial presumption be substituted for the judgment of one's peers. Although it may be readily conceded
that the modern criminal trial too often degenerates into a
battle of wits or into a struggle of the emotions, it must also
be realized that the cure does not lie in a statutory innoculation which may cure the malady by eventually killing the
iTHN

'Presu ptions as First Aid to the District Attorney (1928)

J. 287.
1 REPORT OF

14 A. B. A.

THE COMMISSION ON THE SOCIAL STUDIES, CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOmMENDATIONS (1934) p. 16.
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patient. Rules of evidence alone should not unduly bear the
brunt of the attack upon organized crime and unscrupulous
defense tactics, especially when, in doing so, they become the
tools by which constitutional guaranties of liberty are uprooted and eventually destroyed. Some time ago, Mr. Justice
McReynolds took occasion to warn against the extremes
to which legislative presumptions might lead, when he
remarked:
"Once the thumbscrew and the following confession
made conviction easy; but that method was crude and,
I suppose, now would be declared unlawful upon some
ground. Hereafter, presumption is to lighten the burden of the prosecutor. The victim will be spared the
trouble of confessing and will go to his cell without
mutilation or disquieting outcry." 8
Inasmuch as itris intended to limit this discussion of the
legislative presumption to the question of its constitutionality from the viewpoint of rationality, the following preliminary propositions are to be deemed established or conceded:
(a) That presumptions in the criminal law are presumptions of fact, as distinguished from presumptions of law. As
such, they are not binding on the jury even though they be
4
unrefuted.
(b) That presumptions, per se, are neither argument
nor evidence although they frequently "accomplish the result
of both." 5
(c) That a presumption is a legal concept entirely separate from the concept of "burden of proof." 6
'Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 43 Sup. Ct. 99 (1928).
'People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893).
"The distinction
between a presumption of law and of fact is, that the former is to be declared
and applied by the court in all cases where the facts raising it are established;
and the latter is a question for the determination of the jury, who are to
exercise their judgment in the particular case and find the fact if satisfied of
its truth; or if not so satisfied, refuse to find it." Grover, J., in Stover v.
People, 56 N. Y. 315, 317 (1874).
5 "Presumptions are not in themselves either argument or evidence, although
for the time being they accomplish the result of both." THAYER, PREUMINARY
TREATIsE ox Evmawc (1898) 314. "A presumption is a legal effect of facts,
not a logical effect." Id. at p. 317.
1 See THAYER, op. cil. supra note 5, at 337. For contrary view, see Morgan,
Some Observations Concerning Presumptions (1931) 44 HAv. L. Rv. 906.
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(d) That subject to certain constitutional limitations,
which are to be discussed herein, a legislature in defining a
crime may also enact that proof of certain facts shall be
prima facie evidence of guilt.1
(e) That the term "prima facie proof" in a criminal
case means such
proof as would support a verdict of guilty
8
by the jury.
(f) That an "artificial presumption" is a legislative enactment which provides that a jury may infer the existence
of guilt upon the proof of the existence of some fact or facts
which would not justify the inference at common law.
(g) That the burden of proof in many states and in particular in the state of New York is on the prosecution in
criminal cases.9
Typical of the recent artificial presumptions which have
been enacted, is an addition to the Penal Law of New York,
designed to facilitate proof in a prosecution for the unlawful
possession of dangerous weapons. It reads as follows:
"The presence in an automobile other than a public
omnibus, of any of the following weapons, instruments
or appliances, viz., a pistol, a machine gun, etc., shall
be presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by
all the persons found in such automobile at the time
such weapon, instrument or appliance is found." 10
In the lower court this section survived the first attack
made upon it on the grounds: (a) that it is in violation of
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
so far as it provided that "no person shall be compelled in

I "It has often been held that the legislature, in defining a crime, may also
enact that proofs of facts which are universally recognized as indicating guilt
shall be prima facie evidence of the commission of an offense defined by statute."
Voght v. State, 124 Ind. 358, 24 N. E. 680 (1890).
fro 8 ,Raising a statutory presumption based on proof of a certain fact removes
rom the court the power to set aside a verdict on the ground of insufficient
evidence." Note (1932) 30 MIcH. L. Rav. 600.
'N. Y. CoDE CRIm. PRoc. § 389. "A defendant in a criminal action is

presumed to be innocent until the contrary be proved; and in case of reasonable
doubt0 whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal."
' N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1898a, added by N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 390.
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any criminal case to be a witness against himself"; (b) that
it is in conflict with Article I, Section 6 of the state constitution which contains language substantially similar to
that found in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution; (c) that it is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits any
state from depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; and (d) that it is likewise in conflict
with Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution
which is in effect a re-enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 1 These are the stock objections that appear time and
time again when an artificial presumption is questioned.
Other common arguments against such presumptions, although not urged in this case, include the contentions that
the enactments are in conflict with the presumption of innocence or that they result in the suspension or abolition of
the rule that the prosecution has the burden of proof in the
criminal case. 12 .
However, when the significant statement of Wigmore is
considered, in which he declares that:
"There is not the least doubt, on principle that the
Legislature has entire control over such rules (presumptions), as it has over all other rules of procedure
in general and evidence in particular-subject only to
the limitations of the rules of evidence expressly enshrined in the Constitution," s
it would seem that the fundamental as well as the most usual
problem which would be presented by an artificial presumption, is the determination of its rationality or reasonableness
in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The mere fact that a state statute would change
the burden of proof in a criminal case, 1 4 or would modify the
"Peo. ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, 160 Misc. 327, 290 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1936).
"For a list of cases in which these and other special lines of attack have
been considered, see Brosman, The Statutory Presumption (1931) 5 TuLANrE
L. REv. 178.
WIGMoRE, EvDMENCE (1925) § 1356.
"There is now such a statute in New York. N .Y. VeHxicLr AND TRAvrlc
LAw § 66 reads as follows: "Any person having possession for more than
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presumption of innocence, 15 or would remove the privilege
against self-incrimination 16 ought not and in general does
not condemn it as unreasonable and therefore in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is rationality that looms up

as the fertile field of debate and dissension.
To assert that a law is reasonable is necessarily much

simpler than to demonstrate it. It must be admitted that no
working definition of the word "reasonable" can be stricken

off which could be applied with unerring accuracy to a legislative enactment.' 7

And, yet, the need of determining the

judicial attitude towards the concept of "reason" seems imperative. Legislators cannot function intelligently and within constitutions unless they have some insight into the judicial approach to this problem. Of necessity, an effort should
be made to interpret the term "reasonable in law" in a

fashion which is as concrete and real as the possibilities
permit.
An examination of numerous cases dealing with the "reasonableness" of an artificial presumption reveals that the

courts have prescribed certain well defined tests to which they
submit such a presumption in passing upon its rationality

or reasonableness.

These tests are far from uniform, fre-

quently inconsistent with one another, but withal are mark-

ers which guide in the solution of the problem.
Two of the tests of "reasonableness" which appear more
outstanding than the others and which clash most violently

with each other, are the pragmatic and the a priori. As applied to the question under discussion, the pragmatic test
might be stated as follows: "What social evil do most of
the people desire to eradicate? Everything not immediately
thirty days of a motor vehicle * * * the engine number of which has been
destroyed, removed, defaced, * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ** *'. Upon
a prosecution therefor, lack of knowledge of the condition of such engine, as
to number, shall constitute a defense; but such possession shall be prima facie
evidence that the defendant had such knowledge, and the burden of proof shall
be upon him that he had no such knowledge." Thus far, the statute has not
been subjected to judicial review.
.1
JONES, EVIDENCE (1926) § 46.
"6Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
1 "This failure (to define due process) has been due not to any lack of
judicial effort or acumen but to the very nature of the doctrine, which asserting
a fundamental principle of justice, rather than a specific rule of law, is not

susceptible of more than general statement." WILLOUGHBY,
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d Student's ed. 1933) 723.
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harmful in itself to society and tending to stamp out that
evil is reasonable." 18 It naturally, although not necessarily,
follows that those who use this test focus more on the object
in view than the means applied in its accomplishment. Truth
is based on desires rather than on facts and reason. The
current history of many European nations has proven that
such a procedure, if carried to its logical conclusion is charged
with insurmountable danger to personal liberty. In direct
opposition to the pragmatic method is the a, priori form of
test founded on the concession of the existence of primary
or natural laws known "to us in themselves and not capable
of direct demonstration." 19 Such natural laws are deemed
so much a part of our natural being that their defiance is
nothing less than an act against nature itself-a veritable
descent into chaos. Perhaps the most timely example of the
operation of this test can be found in a hypothetical case,
proposed in the lower court decision in People ex rel. Dixon
v. Lewis, 20 to the following effect: "To enact by statute, for
instance, that anyone found in a house in which a person had
been murdered would be presumed to have caused the death
of such person, would be an arbitrary and unreasonable presumption and clearly in conflict with the constitutional guaranty of a trial by due process of law." In reducing this statement to the first principles of the a priori school of thought,
it might be paraphrased to read as follows: "To enact by
statute that one is capable of being a murderer, who is not
shown to possess a single attribute of a murderer as defined
by law is to state that one may be what he is not. Such a
proposition is contrary to the first principle of contradiction
which is to the effect that 'nothing can at the same time exist
and not exist.' 1121
A third and quite popular test might be classified as the
a posterioritest or the test of experience. It may be summed
up as follows: Does our experience demonstrate that the fact
presumed is usually and probably co-existent with the fact
' Prof. Morris R. Cohen in his work entitled "LAw AND THE SoCIAL
ORDER" criticizes the courts for failing to follow a method such as this in the
solution of constitutional problems.
" RICHARD F. CLARKE, S.J., LOGIc (1927) 32.
160 Misc. 327, 290 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1936).
2 CLARKE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 33.
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from which the presumption flows? Here, great care must be
employed to distinguish between what experience has shown
us to be related and what experience has shown us to be
rarely separated. On the first premise are built our rules of
circumstantial evidence, while on the second is constructed
the theory of the prima.facie case. Furthermore, the first is
designed to influence juries, the latter to compel them.
It was in 1910 that the Supreme Court of the United
States first enunciated its rule in respect to artificial presumptions in the Turnipseed case as follows:
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due
process of law or a denial of the equal protection of
the law, it is only essential that there be some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonableas to be
a purely arbitrary mandate. So, also, it must not
under guise of regulating the presentation of evidence,
operate to preclude the party from the right to22present
his defence to the main fact thus presumed.1
The statute construed and found constitutional in this
case made an injury inflicted on persons or property "by
running of locomotives or cars" of a railroad prima, facie
evidence of negligence. But, in 1929, the same Court in passing upon the constitutionality of a somewhat similar statute
enacted by the State of Georgia found it to be unconstitutional 23 and took occasion to clearly distinguish the logical
effects of the Georgia statute and the one construed in 1919
in the Turnipseed case as follows:
"Mobile J. & R. C. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S.35, 43,-31 Sup.
Ct. 136 (1910).
' Western & A. R. R. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 49 Sup. Ct. 445
(1929). In this case the Court construed § 2780 of the Georgia Civil Code
which reads as follows:
"A railroad company shall be liable for any damages done to persons,
stock, or other property by the running of the locomotives, or cars, or other
machinery of such company, or for damages done by any person in the employment and service of such company, unless the company shall make it appear
that their agents have exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence,
the presumption in all cases being against the company".
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"Each of the state enactments raises a presumption
from the fact of injury caused by the running of locomotive cars. The Mississippi statute created merely
a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the
introduction of opposing testimony. That of Georgia
as construed in this case creates an inference that is
given the effect of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony, and is to prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate."
The distinction is quite obvious. Where the legislature passes
an act in the form of a presumption which calls upon the one
against whom it is raised to come forward or be cast in judgment, it is giving no false or arbitrary meaning to the presumption, but is merely using it as a threat that judgment
will follow if some evidence is not forthcoming from the defendant. In other words, the legislature has provided that if
the plaintiff has proved fact A, the duty of giving some
proof as to the non-existence of fact B is shifted to the
defendant, who must go forward or have fact B found
against him. On the other hand, if a legislature should arbitrarily declare that A equals or may equal B when there
is no human experience or logical process to justify the equation, the statute so enacted is unreasonable. Clearly, the
ends sought to be attained in both statutes were similar, if
not identical. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that a
fundamental concept was ignored in the means adopted by
the Georgia statute. A neither by experience nor in logic
equals B. "If a thing can be true and false at the same time,
to what purpose is it to make any assertion respecting any
single object in the universe? Fact ceases to be fact, truth
ceases to be truth, error ceases to be error." 24 Hence it becomes important to determine whether a legislative presumption is one which creates the duty of proceeding to negative
the existence of certain facts or commands a deduction where
no deduction is logically possible.
Professor Morgan has pointed out that a presumption
may determine the "burden of persuasion" .2 5 Assuming that
CLAiKE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 34.
Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions (1931) 44 HAav.
L. REv. 906.
'
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his conclusions are correct, no court could find any objection
to an artificial presumption which might go so far as to
change the burden of proof in a civil case, where the legislature's power to do so seems undisputed. But, in the criminal case in those jurisdictions where the burden of proof is
on the prosecution, other questions arise. For instance, a
statutory presumption which would arbitrarily change the
burden of persuasion on any element of the crime or require
the defendant to negative the existence of an ingredient of
the crime would be clearly in conflict with the rule as to the
burden of proof.2 Furthermore, if the legislature were to
arbitrarily declare that a jury may consider fact A as presumptive evidence of fact B or even of guilt, the constitutional problem of rationality immediately arises even though
it is expressly provided that the burden27 of proof on the
whole case remains with the prosecution.
Probably the most frequently cited criminal case of state
jurisdiction where the constitutionality of an artificial presumption was involved is People v. Cannon.28 In this case
there was construed the constitutionality of an act prohibiting the unlawful use by junk dealers of bottles etc., marked
as prescribed therein, and further providing that the possession by a junk dealer of such bottles shall be presumptive
evidence of unlawful use, etc. The court found the statute
constitutional and in interpreting it said among other things:
"It cannot be disputed that the courts of this and other
states are committed to the general principle that
even in criminal prosecution the legislature may with
some limitations enact that when certain facts have
been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the
main fact in question. The limitations are that the
fact upon which the presumption is to rest must have
some fair relation to or natural connection with the
main fact."
People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893).
- "In a criminal prosecution, non-action of the defendant cannot be substituted for action upon the part of the state, as to any matter required to be
established as a part of the state's case.' State v. La Pointe, 81 N. H. 227,
123 Atl. 692 (1920).
139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893).
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It should be noted that the court was not giving sanction
to a presumption that merely changed the duty of going forward but was insisting on a natural relationship between the
fact in issue and the fact from which the presumption followed. Without the statutory presumption, "possession"
would be merely a relevant fact, not sufficient in itself to
bring the case to the jury, but by virtue of the statute this
relevant fact was raised to the dignity of prinma facie proof,
which would warrant a submission of the question of guilt
to the jury. Naturally, the degree of relativity must be very
high to attribute such certainty to a single fact.
INSTANCES OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS

A reference to some of the decisions, where artificial presumptions have been held unconstitutional might tend at
this point to clarify the meaning of "relationship" and "natural connection" as expressed in People v. Cannon. 2 9 Cases
in which unconstitutionality has been declared seem to reveal
more clearly the judicial approach to the subject, than do
those cases where the presumptions have been approved. The
latter for the most part are replete with generalities and
devoid of analysis and adopt as a rule the familiar arguments
of Wigmore as the rule of the case.3 0
In Manley v. Georgi, 31 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a legislative enactment creating a presumption of fraud on the part of the president and directors of a
bank from the mere fact of insolvency was unreasonable and
arbitrary. Apparently the Court in determining what was
unreasonable was relying on logic and experience, and could
find no connection in either between insolvency and fraud.
That the legislature might have intended to shift the burden
2Ibid.
' "A rule

of presumption is simply a rule changing the burden of proof,
i.e. declaring that the main fact will be inferred or assumed from some other
fact until evidence to the contrary is introduced (post, sec. 2490). There is not
the least doubt, on principle, that the Legislature has entire control over such
rules, as it has over all other rules of procedure in general and evidence in
particular-subject only to the limitations of the rules of evidence expressly
enshrined in the Constitution". WiGme, EvmENCE (1925) § 1356.
31279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215 (1928). This ruling was followed in People
v. Mancuso, 255 N. Y. 463, 175 N. E. 177 (1931).
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of persuasion of proof was not even considered. "The connection," said the Court, "between the fact proved and the fact
presumed is not sufficient." "Reasoning does not lead from
one to the other."
In Oklahoma, a statute was held unconstitutional which
provided:
"It shall be unlawful for any person who is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, or who is a habitual
user of narcotic drugs, and the having on or about
one's person or in said vehicle of said intoxicating
liquor is prima facie evidence of the violation of this
act, to operate or drive a motor vehicle on any highway
within the state etc." 32
The Court pointed out that the deduction sought to be
drawn was entirely too remote in that there must first be the
inference that the driver had used the intoxicants and the
further inference that he had used them to such an extent
that he was under the influence thereof to the extent of
intoxication. Although Professor Wigmore characterizes this
decision as "unsound" 33 it would appear that it is in conformity with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Manley
4
3

case.

In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute establishing an eight-hour day on public
works with the exception that employees who were given a
half holiday on Saturday might work eight hours a day on
other days and further providing that working more than
eight hours in any one day shall be prima facie evidence of
the violation of the statute. Although this ruling has met
with a similar characterization of "unsoundness" by Professor Wigmore, the following language of the Court seems more
than convincing from a purely rational viewpoint:
"We are of the opinion that the Legislature has no
constitutional authority to punish any citizen merely
Simpkins v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 143, 249 Pac. 168 (1926).
(Supp. 2d ed. 1934) § 1356.
279 U. S. 1, 49 Sup. Ct. 215 (1928).
WIGM ORE, EVIDENCE
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upon evidence of the existence of a fact which in
ordinary cases has no tendency to establish guilt." 11
The Court is emphatic in differentiating between evidence which might have some relevancy to guilt, and evidence
which has a strong tendency to establish it. This thought
might be amplified by the following proposition: The fact
that one had a motive to kill another is relevant in a prosecution for homicide, but of and in itself would not have a tendency to establish guilt.
In a significant decision in Idaho, there was declared
unconstitutional an act of the legislature which provided that
the failure of anyone to retain in his possession for thirty
days the hides removed from any cattle slaughtered by him
is prima facie evidence of the commission by such person of
the crime of grand larceny of the cattle which he had so
slaughtered. 8 In the clearest of language, the Court laid
bare the crux of the problem, when it stated:
"So long as the evidence is of itself materialand rlevant, the statute may make it prima facie proof of the
ultimate fact which it tends to establish, and may thus
shift the burden of evidence. Where, however, there is
no connection or rational relationship between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact to be presumed, such a
statute shifts the burden of proof, and in a criminal
case deprives the defendant of his constitutional guaranties. * * *
"The act of a person in disposing of the hide of
an animal within 30 days after it has been slaughtered
by him is an act innocent in itself, except as made
otherwise by statute. Under this statute one could be
convicted without any evidence that any cattle of any
description had been stolen from any person. The
instruction, if followed by the jury, relieved the state
from the necessity of offering any evidence of the
corpus delicti. It deprived the defendant of the benefit
of any presumption of innocence, and required him to
-In

re Opinion of Justices, 208 Mass. 619, 94 N. E. 1044 (1911).

'State

v. Grimmett, 33 Idaho 203, 193 Pac. 380 (1920).

1937 ]

ARTIFICIAL PRESUMPTIONS

take the burden, not only of proving his own innocence, but perhaps of proving that the crime had not
been committed."
Here is an application of the a, prioritest. When experience
demonstrates that the facts from which the deduction is
drawn are in no way connected with the ultimate fact, then
the deduction 7becomes an operation of the imagination and
not of reason.
In State v. Besvick, 38 the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island found unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the sale
of liquors wherein it was also enacted that:
"It shall not be necessary to prove an actual sale of
the liquors * * * in any building etc., * * * in order to
establish the fact that any of said liquors are there
kept for sale; but the notorious character of any such
premises, or the notorious bad or intemperate character of persons frequenting the same, or the keeping of
the implements or appurtenances usually appertaining to grog-shops, tippling shops or places where such
liquors are sold, shall be prima facie evidence that
such liquors are kept on such premises for the purpose
of sale within this state."
In its decision the court applied the a priori test most
convincingly as follows:
"Indeed to hold that a legislature can create artificial
presumptions of guilt from facts which are not only
consistent with innocence, but are not even a constituent part of the crime when committed, is to hold that
it has the power to take away from a judicial trial, or
at least substantially reduce in it the very element
"Here (referring to prima facie evidence) the legislature is not merely
attaching procedural consequences to the proof of a certain fact or group of

facts, but is giving to the proved fact or facts artificial weight as evidence.
* * * It is submitted, therefore, that due process might well require that in
order to support a finding of fact B (from proof of fact A) there must be
some evidence logically tending to prove it."

Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-

Their Constitutionality and Legal Effect (1931)
13 R. I. 219 (1881).

10 Tax. L. REv. 34.
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which makes it judicial. To hold so is to hold that the
legislature has power to bind and circumscribe the
judgments of courts and juries in matters of fact and
in an important measure to predetermine their decisions and verdicts for them."
The test which was applied might also be designated as
the "ingrediency" test since it requires that the facts out of
which the presumption arises should not only be relevant to
the crime but should constitute in themselves an element of
the crime presumed. The "ingrediency" test and the "a
p7iori" test are one and the same in that they both stand for
the fundamental principle that fact A can never equal fact
BC nor be an integral part of it, where facts A, B, and 0
represent identities distinct from one another.
THia TRIUND IN"NEW YORK

The early law in New York concerning artificial presumptions was crystallized in the case of People v. Canno, 89
to which reference has been made. The crime involved was
the unlawful use of second-hand bottles and the presumption
of illegality was drawn from proof of use. It appears that
the test of "relevancy" and "ingrediency" were both satisfied.
In fact the court stated that "it (use) is some evidence of the
main fact and the strength of it is properly a matter for
legislative enactment in the first instance."
Ten years after the decision in the Cannon case, no little
confusion came into the law when the Court of Appeals in
People v. Adams,40 held constitutional a statute prohibiting
the possession of policy slips under certain defined circumstances. 41 Whereas the court found no constitutional viola- 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759 (1893). Prior to this, the court in Board v.
Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484 (1886) had held constitutional a statute
making the drinking of liquor on premises, prima facie evidence of occupant's
sale with intent that liquor should be there drunk.
40176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903).
,N. Y. PENAL LAW § 975: "Possession of policy slips.
"The possession, by any person other than a public officer, of any writing,
paper, or document representing or being a record of any chance, share or
interest in numbers, sold, given away, drawn, or selected, or to be drawn or
selected, or in what is commonly called 'policy', or in the nature of a bet,
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tion in the statute and affirmed on the authority of the
Cannon case, it said that the "legislature has cast the burden
of proof upon the person who has in his possession these incriminating papers." This is a surprising statement in view
of the fact that in the Cannon case the court expressly ruled
that such a presumption "does not in reality and finally
change the burden of proof." In all other respects the decision seems sound in that the presumption of illegality of
possession arises out of the relevant fact of possession which
is an ingredient of the crime.
42
Subsequently, in People ew rel. Woronoff v. Mallo,
the Court of Appeals turned .to the pragmatic test in its
determination of what was reasonable. In this case the constitutionality of the presumption enacted by Section 42 44
of the Penal Law was involved. In approving this enactment
as applicable to a prosecution for larceny by false pretenses
the court manifested its pragmatic approach when it said:
"The criminal law of our state attempts to meet the
new devices and methods of committing crime and
wager or insurance upon the drawing or selection, or the drawn or selected
numbers of any public or private lottery, or any paper, print, writing, numbers
of device, policy slip, or article of any kind, such as is commonly used in
carrying on, promoting or playing the game commonly called 'policy' is presumptive evidence of possession thereof knowingly and in violation of the provisions of section nine hundred and seventy-four. (Amended by L. 1926, ch.
435, in effect July 1, 1926.)"
42222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102 (1918).
' N. Y. PENAL LAW § 442: "Whenever property shall be purchased by aid
of a statement relatng to the purchaser's means or ability to pay, made in
writing and signed by the party to be charged, and in said statement the party
to be charged shall state that he conducts a specified kind of business and keeps
books of account of said business, then, if at the expiration of any term of
credit obtained by him in so purchasing said property he shall fail to pay for
the same, he shall at all times during the period of ninety days subsequent to
such failure to pay, upon the request of the persons from whom said property
was purchased, or their agents duly accredited in writing, produce within ten
days after such request is made his said books of account and each and every
one of them mentioned or described in said statement and permit the personsfrom whom said property was purchased, or their agents duly accredited in
writing, to fully examine such books of account and each and every one of
them mentioned or described in said statement, and to make copies of any part
thereof. Upon such request being made, failure to so produce within ten days
said books of account and each and every one of them mentioned or described
in said statement ,shall be presumptive evidence that each and every pretense
relating to the purchaser's means or ability to pay in said statement contained
were false at the time of making said statement and were known to the purchaser to be false."
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stamp out and punish fraud and theft in its many
disguises,"
and further stated:
"So in this case, experience and habits and customs
of honest merchants and trades people, would naturally lead to the conclusion that if a purchaser refused
to verify his financial statement by his books, something was crooked and that he was dishonest. Section
442 of the Penal Law has merely codified this natural
presumption."
Since the crime charged was larceny by false pretenses,
the failure to produce the books might well be a relevant
fact, but surely not an ingredient of the crime. This decision
as do many others on the subject relies in part on People v.
Galbo,44 where the common-law rule was applied that one
found in recent possession of the fruits of a crime may be
inferred to be its perpetrator. This rule does not seem in
point since it is applied at common law only after there is
proof offered that a crime has been committed in which the
identity of the perpetrator is in question. At best, possession
of the fruits of a crime is a fact which fairly calls for an
explanation from him whose knowledge in this respect is
peculiar to himself.
Attention was focused on the relevancy and ingrediency
tests as such for the first time in 1932 by the dissent of
Justice Martin in Eff Ess, etc., v N. Y. Edison Co.,4 5 wherein
the constitutionality of Section 1431a 46 of the Penal Law
was determined. By Section 1431 of the Penal Law, the
altering or tampering with an electric light meter is made a
crime and by Section 1431a the legislature has prescribed
certain conditions which are deemed presumptive evidence
- 218 N. Y. 283, 112 N. E. 1041 (1916).
'237 App. Div. 315, 261 N. Y. Supp. 126 (1st Dept. 1932).
" N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1431a: "The existence of any of the conditions
with reference to meters, or attachments described in section fourteen hundred
and thirty-one of this article is presumptive evidence that the person to whom
gas, electricity, water or steam is at the time being furnished by or through such
meters or attachments has, with intent to defraud created or caused to be
created with reference to such meters or attachments, the condition so existing.
(Added by L. 1926, ch. 849, in effect May 19, 1926.)"
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of the violation of the first mentioned statute. In the upholding of this presumption, it is submitted that the prevailing
opinion erroneously applied the ingrediency test when it
stated that a subscriber for electric service is "in effect the
receiver of stolen current." In his dissent, Justice Martin
pointed out quite clearly that this was not the case:
"The meter in this case was not in the basement or
cellar, but was in a public hallway where anyone
might have tampered with it. There are many conditions here present which make this presumption unreasonable."
It is clear that the dissent was urging in principle the necessity of ingrediency in all criminal presumptions created by
statute. Illegality of use ought not to be predicated on a
mere order to supply.
Two artificial presumptions which were recently enacted
have been challenged in the courts on the ground of unconstitutionality. One, Section 772 of the Penal Law, 47 makes it
a crime for persons bearing an evil reputation or engaging in
an unlawful occupation to consort with criminals. The other,
Section 1898a of the Penal Law, 48 created an artificial presumption in reference to the possession of weapons found in
a motor vehicle. The consorting statute which provided that
47
N. Y. PENAL LAW § 722: "Any person who with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned,
commits any of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the

offense of disorderly conduct. * * *

"Subd. 11. Is engaged in some illegal occupation or who bears an
evil reputation and with an unlawful purpose consorts with thieves and
criminals or frequents unlawful resorts;
"Subd. 12. In any prosecution under subdivision eleven of this section the fact that defendant is engaged in an illegal occupation or bears
an evil reputaton, and is found consorting with persons of like evil reputation, thieves or criminals shall be prima facie evidence that such consorting was for an evil purpose. (Sec. am'd. by L. 1936, ch. 896, § 2.)"
' N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1898a: "The possession, by any person other than a
public officer, of any of the weapons, instruments or appliances specified in
sections eighteen hundred and ninety-seven and eighteen hundred and ninetyseven-a except as permitted therein, is presumptive evidence of carrying, concealing or possessing with intent to use the same in violation of this article.
The presence of any such weapon, instrument or appliance in any stolen vehicle
is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all the persons found in
such vehicle at the time such weapon, instrument or appliance is found (am'd.
by L. 1936, ch. 137)."
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proof of consorting would be prima facie evidence that such
consorting was for an illegal purpose was declared constitutional 49 by the dictum of the Court of Appeals. Although
the pragmatic approach is revealed when the court says that
the statute is "an attempt to prevent crime by disrupting and
scattering the breeding spot", it would seem that the ingrediency test has been met. Consorting, one of the elements
of the crime, must be proven before the prosecution will be
entitled to a presumption of illegality of purpose.
The presumption created by Section 1898a of the Penal
Law 50 might be illustrated as follows: Upon proof that A is
in a privately owned automobile and upon further proof that
there is a weapon in this automobile, A shall be presumed to
be in illegal possession of such weapon. It should be observed
that in order to be entitled to the presumption, the prosecution need give no proof of either illegality or possession,
which constitute the elements of the crime. Is there any
established connection between proximity to a thing and
dominion over that thing? In declaring the statute constitutional, the Special Term of the Supreme Court relied to a
great extent on the common-law doctrine that the burden of
"proving the existence of a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused is placed upon him"."1 It is on this very
theory that error is most likely to infiltrate, unless great
stress is placed upon its limitations. Every person charged
with crime surely has peculiar knowledge as to whether he
has committed it but no one could conceive that under our
present system, a jury should be advised that the failure of
a defendant in a homicide case to give evidence of innocence
of which he has peculiar knowledge, should result in an unfavorable inference against him. The "peculiar knowledge"
doctrine has and should be limited in unlawful possession
cases to those instances where the prosecution proves the
genus and the knowledge of the species is readily available
to the defendant. Where the charge is unlawful possession,
" People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315, 197 N. E. 295 (1936). It should be noted
that the convictions in this case were reversed on the facts.
'oSupra note 48.
' Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y. 177 (1870); People v. Galbo, 218
N. Y. 283, 112 N. E. 1041 (1916) ; People ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, - Misc.-,
290 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1936).

1937 ]

ARTIFICIAL PRESUMPTIONS

possession is the genus and illegality the species. Surely, the
prosecution gives no proof of the genus "possession" when it
proves "proximity". The defendant's silence under such a
situation should be construed as a characterization of his
"proximity" and not of his "possession".
By a 3-2 vote, the Appellate Division of the Third Department has declared Section 1898a of the Penal Law unconstitutional.52 With stern rigor, the Justices who voted
against the constitutionality of this section have applied the
a prior!system of reasoning. Justice Rhodes in his opinion
states the a prioripoint of view in the following manner:
"It is a truism requiring neither argument nor demonstration to establish that the Legislature has not the
power, nor has any other human agency the power, by
fiat, to make two plus two other than four; neither
has it the power to give substance to shadows nor to
declare that to be proof which inherently lacks probative force."
With equal emphasis does the concurring opinion of Justice
McNamee lay bare the absurdity of a purely pragmatic approach to presumptions in the criminal law. He writes:
"An automobile is not designed for the commission of crime, albeit sometimes it is devoted to such
an end. Also, because of its fleetness, it may be useful
to criminals. But the same is true of motorcycles, airships, railroad trains and similar devices in common
use by the people. But to say that one who innocently
steps into an automobile may, ipso facto, place himself in the criminal class, and subject himself to criminal prosecution, because of the unrelated fact that at
sometime a pistol had been placed in the car and still
remains there, is to assert something that is unreal,
and has not the support of reason. It is against reason. If this presumption were sound in law under our
u People ex rel. Dixon v. Lewis, - App. Div. -, 293 N. Y. Supp. 191
(1937). Through the courtesy of the Honorable Henry S. Kahn, Assistant
District Attorney of Albany County, the author was furnished with a copy of
the decision in this case in advance of publication in the official reports.
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constitutional limitations, it is difficult to see why it
may not be extended with equal force to every home
in the States; as homes, and 'hide-outs' of various
kinds, have been reduced to their purpose by criminals. The patient on his way to the hospital, or the
physician or clergyman being hastily conveyed to the
bedside of the sick, may be jeopardizing his legal character. If this presumption be legally effective, one
may be convicted of crime when guilty of no unlawful
act, has no guilty knowledge, harbors no evil intent.
This result is not within the contemplation of the
common law, nor of our Constitution. It amounts to
a total disregard of due process of law."
Clearly and decisively Justice McReynolds also points out
that the statute is defective even from the a posteriori viewpoint which requires that the facts proven have a tendency
to establish guilt. He states:
"The facts presumed must have a persuasive tendency
to establish the fact to be proved; and the presumption must rest upon a fact or circumstance of 'sinister
significance'. This is not even a case of a presumption
which obstructs a defendant in the presentation of his
defense; there is nothing against which to defend, because no crime has been proved."
In a brief opinion, the dissenting Justices applied apparently
the purely pragmatic test in reaching the conclusion that the
statute was constitutional. The dissenting opinion reads as
follows:
"We are unable to say that an automobile wherein a
pistol is found is not so closely allied with present day
criminality and criminal methods that the Legislature
may not enact as an evidentiary rule that a presumption of possession arises against a person riding in an
automobile so equipped."
No one can deny that there is grave danger to society in
permitting criminals to ride in armed vehicles and neverthe-
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less escape punishment because of the difficulty of proving
possession of the weapons against the occupants. The criminal
and not the law is keeping pace with the technological deveL
opments in transportation and communication. But, should
this menace to society be destroyed by a method, which if it
takes root and is nourished by judicial approbation may
spread until it undermines and weakens that society
which it was designed to protect? Should liberty be lost,
future historians will probably discover that it was due to
an arbitrary interpretation of the rules of procedure rather
than a planned organization of economic forces.

CONCLUSIONS

In order that an artificial presumption in the criminal
law be deemed reasonable:
1. The fact out of which the presumption flows should
be relevant to the crime charged. In this respect, the test
is a posteriori;
and
2. The fact out of which the presumption flows should
constitute an ingredient of the crime charged. In this respect, the test is a, priori;
and
3. The fact out of which the presumption flows should
be one which experience has demonstrated to be closely connected with the establishment of the crime as distinguished
from evidence of the crime. To this extent, the test is a
posteriori.
EDWARD

St. John's University School of Law.

J. O'TooLm.

